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Neurointerfaces, Mental Imagery and Sensory Translation  




 The chapter focuses on the issue of transmedial and sensory exchange in the context of 
digital culture and biometric technology. EEG (electroencephalography) and other brainwaves 
sensing technologies become an increasingly popular tool that allows translation of mind activity 
into data and sensible forms, such as visualizations, sonifications, and others. But do these forms 
indeed represent in the best way how the human mind works? Recent connectivist approaches to 
the body show that there are translations that happen between various sensory apparata within 
the body that offer observable sensations standing for processes in seemingly unrelated systems 
– the phenomenon described as sensory substitution. These exchanges demonstrate that whatever 
may seem unobservable and undetectable from one perspective (in one modality), can reveal 
itself in another way. This expands the understanding of what can be called the visible and hence 
redefines the contours of what escapes not only visual representation, the invisible, but also 
perception more broadly, the unperceivable. Electronic sensing technologies augment the optical 
apparatus and allow us to talk about not so much observation, but detection, which comes down 
to identifying signals. Machines do that analogously to the body itself: communication within the 
body is based on signals sent electrically and chemically. Staying invisible from the optical 
perspective, this information is sensible and communicable in a different way. Thus, the same 
problem of translation presents itself both at the level of intention and signal production in the 
human/operator’s brain and body and at the level of technology that processes and interprets the 
information received from the body.  
 The practices of collaborative artistic and scientific experimentation open up new 
perspectives on how to treat cognitive processes that stay optically invisible even to their own 
subject. Multimedia performances and artistic experiments designed in partnership with 
neuroscientists pose a question of translation between different sensory modalities, as well as 
translation between human perceptive apparatus and computational systems. Artistic scenarios 
help to both localize and expand these questions, challenging the existing conceptions and 
offering new methods of analysis. Despite the growing scope of neuroimaging application, there 
are still questions about the relevance of these mechanisms of interpretation to the given material 
– mind activity.  Among the questions to be posed are: Under what condition cognitive states can 
be equated to images? How do interfaces that engage various perceptual modalities help to 
represent what and how human mind sees? What does it mean ethically and politically that an 
inner image of perception could be detected and rewritten back onto the brain or onto another 
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person’s brain? Most importantly, what do these interfaces change in human interaction with 
each other, and how does the artistic approach help to clarify and expand these questions? 
 
 Mental images and the problem of mediated representation 
 
The concept of mental image is shared by several disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, 
neurosciences and others, and can be roughly defined as representations in the mind of situations 
and objects that are not physically perceived at the moment of the image experience. This can 
include both imagined pictures and the ones coming from memories of the lived experiences. 
Today’s image theory (an integral field that grew out of theoretizations about the role of visual 
perception within art history and theory) offers a broader understanding of images that in 
addition to visual objects also includes distinct sensory formations, such as perceptual images, or 
inner impressions based on sense data. W.J.T Mitchell and Gottfried Boehm discuss the value of 
iconicity as a form of thinking, which is both non-symbolic and non-mimetic.1 Conceived this 
way, images do not have to correspond to a state of actual affairs (as proposed in the classical 
picture theory of language by Wittgenstein).2 Instead, they form a meaning by the fact of 
presentation, the fact of a traceable, observable change of state. What is important, is how the 
experiencing subject comes to the awareness of that change. It happens through the act of 
recognition of the perceptory event itself, by bringing special attention to its appearance. As I 
will demonstrate below, biofeedback-based technologies complicate what is meant by the very 
concept of observation. By automatically detecting bio-signals, such as brainwaves or changes in 
heart rate, they mediate the awareness of those changes: a person recognizes them not when they 
are felt, but when they are shown by the technology.  
 Under this extended definition of an image, mental images can include representations in 
the mind of the outside world not available directly through senses, and any imagined sensorial 
impressions felt without external stimulus. The question is then whether or not to treat them as 
real if they are only imagined. Mental imagery’s ontological status has been an old problem in 
philosophy: whether or not these images represent any “reality,” or whether they can be treated 
as true and trustworthy (e.g. Descartes’s dismissal of the phantom limb sensations as anything 
corresponding to reality). More recently the ontological agenda gave a way toward thinking of 
the nature of both facts and their representations as more fluid and not directly relatable, and 
thus, what would be more important to consider is the effects produced by representations (both 
external and mental). Image scientists have been advocating for image agency, or the potential of 
the image to act upon human perception and thinking,3 to organize thinking in a diagrammatical 
manner, and to function as operational tools that guide both the gaze and physical action.4 To an 
extent, these conceptions are based on the findings of cognitive neuroscientists about the 
connections between perception, representation and cognition.5 The new software-enabled 
technologies of visualization bring the role of an image to another level – of providing feedback 
on one’s own bodily and thinking processes (that are otherwise invisible). Thus, the way the 
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feedback is presented plays a crucial role in restructuring and reordering the processes of gaining 
awareness.  
 The translation of bodily processes into representable forms, i.e. digital models of 
behavioral and experiential activities, implies a certain level of abstraction and virtualization of 
the material process. This poses a problem of the virtualization of the bodily experience. The 
invisible acquires its visible models and thus can be treated as something potentially modifiable, 
operable. Yet, it is still available to the senses only as virtual. Media theorists, like Anna 
Munster, argue that such models cannot replace the sense-making strategies of the body itself 
and the heterogeneity of corporeal and material dimensions of knowledge production in the 
digital era.6 Others, such as Mark Hansen, tend to embrace the potential of machinic cognition 
and its feedback capabilities to deepen the physical sense of self. He points to Merleau-Ponty’s 
famous distinction between the body image and the body schema, where the former is 
characterized by an understanding of the body through vision as an external object and the latter 
emerges from the “operational” perspective of the embodied organism itself. According to 
Hansen, motion capture technologies create extensions not only of the body image, but also of 
the body schema, allowing, for instance, to “see through the hand” and to facilitate a “self-
reflexive experience of one’s embodied agency in the world.”7 Yet this experience comes at a 
price: the same technology shapes the sensations “before the emergence of bodily self-
perception.”8 The problem with both Merleau-Ponty’s and Hansen’s interpretation is that the 
mental image of the body schema is something harder to pinpoint once they are “images” in a 
broader sense – sensorial impressions (rather than visual entities).  
 Although not directly related, these arguments and cautions find productive resonance 
with the discourse of critical neuroscience. The brain imaging methods serve as an example of a 
digital model of the body. Visualization of mind activity (as representative of the activity of the 
body as a whole) is also grounded in framing that activity itself as an image. The point of 
critique here is that the brain becomes considered as a locus of subjectivity, and images are taken 
to estimate the psychological state (that can lead to further ethical and legal conclusions9). As Jan 
de Vos argues, images adopted by and circulated through popular culture invite us to perceive 
ourselves iconographically.10 Yet since the new imaging techniques rely more on computation 
rather than traditional form of visual sensing, the point of discussion is not just images, but 
“statistical maps.”11 While the difficulty of describing mental images is the subjective qualities 
that complicate their sharing, the “statistical maps”, or data-images created with the assistance of 
machines are limited by the numerical apparatus and the structures of the algorithms applied to 
them. Yet, since the beginning of application of numerical methods in medical studies, they were 
considered progressive exactly for the promise of not only discovery, but more efficient 
communication. Experimental psychophysiology of the late 19 century was revolutionary not 
only due to its empiricism, but to the usage of the emerging measuring instruments. The founder 
of the field, Wilhelm Wundt, assigned his students not a scientific problem, but a task of finding 
applications for the devices, such as tachistoscopes, chronoscopes, pendulums, electrical devices, 
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timers, and sensory mapping devices, that altogether were thought to produce a sense of what 
Lorain Daston and Peter Galison will later call “mechanical objectivity”.12 
 In the case of brain-machine interaction, the image can be found in the very electric 
circuit constructed for brain stimulation or for reading the signals coming from the brain. Its 
design would be an intermediary that would allow certain data to either be counted or not. But 
the correlations between the initial signals and their “output” are far from being direct. 
 Visualization of mind activity is grounded in how that activity itself is framed as an 
image. Yet, the only access to that activity is interpretation of the electric signals that in their 
nature are dynamic. The image of a mental activity at stake is fluid and is based on continuous 
comparison of discrete states. At the foundation of that is also the fluctuation of the states of 
“on” and “off” of extremely complex networks of neurons, often described analogously to 
flashing (like a photographic flash that is needed to reveal a picture and bring it “to light”). With 
neuronal “flashing” the basic picture taken is only of the constellation, the distribution of the 
signals throughout the network at a given moment in time. Since essentially the sensed signals 
form datasets, their spatial organization is dependent on external parameters. In order to be read 
or even simply perceived, they need to be translated into a sensible form – a representation or 
action. 
 Technically, brain- (or neuro-) imaging technologies such as PET scans (positron 
emission tomography) and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) that show structures 
and areas of activity within the brain differ in principle from the interface technology of EEG 
(electroencephalogram) that represents dynamics of particular brainwaves. Both PET and fMRI 
images are based on correlations between brain activity and cerebral blood flow that can be 
demonstrated via special “tracers” injected in the blood (e.g. positron-emitting radionuclide 
tracers or contrast dye that lights up while placed in the magnetic field). EEG does not require 
injections and expensive scanners and tracks the electric activity of the brain as it is.  
 Electric sensing may be compared to other types of non-visual detection, or “seeing 
beyond the visible,” for instance, a sophisticated combination of haptic, visual and quantum level 
perception used in nanotechnology to image surfaces at the atomic level. When a conducting tip 
of a scanning tunneling microscope (STM) is brought near the examined surface, it is essentially 
a type of touch: a tunnel is formed through which the detecting electron can “feel” the surface 
and produce a measurable current. Colin Milburn calls this type of sensing “nanovision”: 
“looking into itself, nanotechnology looks outward from blindness – and sees otherwise. … It is 
a way of seeing that lyses the membrane between the technological present and the 
nanotechnological future.”13 Vision, the ability to see as the traditional route for acquiring 
knowledge is here complicated by “seeing otherwise,” seeing beyond the membrane of visibility, 
beyond the border between the real and the imaginary/speculative/unproven. Image “beyond 
visibility” works here as an “interior image” (Gerard Milburn), the product of a technologically 
mediated vision that is neither purely optical, nor haptic. In that sense, it introduces 
“dreamscapes” of technology and animates “a productive dialogue and conflict between 
presentism and futurism, between humanistic thought and its other.”14 Similarly, brain signals 
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processing requires its own sensing mechanism, generating its own sense that goes beyond the 
visual (even with visual images as results).  
 Both nanovision and the brain imaging and interface technologies exemplify a “machinic 
sense”, or “machinic vision.” According to John Johnston, machine vision presumes “not only an 
environment of interacting machines and human-machine systems but a field of decoded 
perceptions that, whether or not produced by or issuing from these machines, assume their full 
intelligibility only in relation to them.”15 Despite stretching the borders of perception, such type 
of vision is self-contained, i.e. it creates “maps” that can be comprehended and interpreted only 
with the knowledge of the logic of the apparatus.16 Its genealogy can be traced back to such 
fateful events as the invention of the telescope and other visual prostheses for natural perception 
that unanchored perception from the field of the human body’s natural capacities and became the 
first technologies used not just as tools, but as direct extensions of senses, and through that – as 
tools of (literally) constructive thinking.  
 Looking inside the human mind in order to simply create its map (a diagnostic gaze of 
fMRI scanning) and activating the images stemming from human imagination itself is principally 
different. The brain-map registers the ‘state of affairs,’ but cannot transmit what kind of inner 
processing is taking place, what the experiencing subject actually feels and imagines during the 
process of scanning. Yet, machinic vision can function also in a generative sense, turning from 
reflection to action. The indistinct feelings and states of mind can acquire more concrete, even 
material forms (e.g. in their “Brain Factory” (2016) Maurice Benayoun and Tobias Klein 
fabricate 3D-printed reifications of brain states). The constructive, generative capabilities of 
neurointerface technology expand the meaning of machinic vision by demonstrating the new 
types of interpretive action enabled by brain scanning. 
  
 Sensory translation in artistic perspective 
 
The idea of translation considered here is not a linguistic one of transference of meaning from 
one language to another, but a transference of relations, mapping, and ‘porting,’ akin to porting 
of a piece of software into another programming platform. Instead of correlations, there are 
analogies – more dynamic and fluid connections that depend on a more complex network of 
associative links. The notion of meaning is still important, and yet it is not a meaning in the sense 
of semiotics, a meaning as the signified, i.e. captured behind a signifier. Mental images – 
understood in a broader sense, as perceptual events – challenge the binaries of semiotic 
schematization and hence complexify the concept of translation.  
 The problem of complementarity between the senses has troubled people for ages. Until 
the relatively recent neuroscientific studies philosophy could only speculate about the differences 
in types of perception and in their objects. If one kind of perception is not enough to give a 
comprehensive idea of reality there would always be something missing from the view. The 
neuronal firing activity may be treated as a signification system for different kinds of senses and 
synaesthetic exchanges; figuring it out may be compared to discovering a universal translation 
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code for establishing connection between the outer and inner worlds. Yet, as the digital code 
studies teach us, the reducability of the information to discrete on/off signals means that it 
becomes harder, if not completely impossible, to restore the message in its full sense and hence 
to reproduce its qualitative content. Thus, it is important to understand what exactly may be 
missing in translation from one sense to another at the level of the biologically installed code. 
 The “blind” spots of this system have been inspiring for a number of contemporary artists 
working with neurointerface technologies. Scientific experiments on the brain functions are 
fundamentally studies of human perceptual experiences; the interest and contribution of the 
artists, then, becomes to generate scenarios that would open up new avenues of research and 
problematize existing paradigms. 
 The types of sensory and mental images translation can roughly be classified in the 
following way: 1) from images to mental images; 2) from mental images to images; 3) from 
images to constellations of signals; 4) from mental images to datasets and their interpretations; 5) 
from mental images to movements; 6) from haptic stimulation to recognizable and 
nonrecognizable images. This schema is in no way comprehensive and rather serves as an outline 
for further discussion of translatory practices and particular issues attached to them. Artistic 
scenarios help both to localize and to expand these questions, challenging the existing 
conceptions and offering new methods of analysis. Examples can include both the artworks using 
neurointerfaces, and neuroscientific experimentation done in collaboration with artists. 
 
 1. Translation from images to mental images implies the most obvious starting point of 
perception: creation of representations in the mind of events and objects that have been seen by 
the subject in one way or another. We remember faces and places visually, which allows us to 
navigate in the world. This algorithm is seemingly simple, yet there is broad variation in terms of 
the attention of seeing (or perceiving in general): the details considered as less important may be 
ignored and not remembered. 
  
 2. Translation from mental images to images is also a well known procedure that 
describes how images, such as drawings, paintings, etc. emerge from imagination: before taking 
material form and being shared with others they have to be envisioned within an individual mind. 
At the stage of making them perceivable by others, i.e. turning them into a sensible form, the 
specificity of the material, medium of expression will affect not only the result, but how it is 
envisioned. 
  
 3. Various machinic vision technologies allow analysis of images that differs from the 
capabilities of the unaided eye. Aside from the advanced techniques, such as brain-imaging, or 
electronic microscopy, it was already the tools needed for transmitting visual signals at a 
distance, i.e. the technology of television, that would enable breaking an image to the flow (or 
constellation) of electronic signals. In the context of visualizing physiological data it means 
creation of simulated models that would rely on the established indexical connection with the 
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original “picture.” The same principle is used in so called visual reconstruction. MRI-based 
technologies of visual reconstruction can help to reconstruct the image that comes as input to the 
visual cortex through the retina. As UC Berkeley neuroscientist Jack Gallant suggests, it will 
soon “open a window into the movies in our mind.”17 Visual reconstruction establishes 
correlations between the input images and the observable patterns of brain activity allowing if 
not to “read” one’s mind, then at least to “see” the recreations of visual images inside someone’s 
mind. The images that Gallant produces with his software are still quite abstract and blurry, but 
there are definitely visible correlations between the image shown to the experimental participant 
and the computer reproduction of that image based on the brain signals of the viewing subject. 
(Yet, it is still not possible to capture and reconstruct dreams or images appearing without the 
external input.) Detecting brain patterns corresponding to visual memories is at the center of 
brain ‘fingerprinting,’ an EEG-based forensic technique for determining the presence of a 
specific information in the brain that is discovered through the analysis of the brain response to 
particular pictures and phrases. Used successfully in courtrooms, this technology provokes 
reasonable privacy concerns, for instance if certain data and codes that reside in the mind could 
be extracted by hackers.18 
 Neuroscientists admit that perceptual experience consists of an enormous number of 
possible states. The key for implementing successful studies is to establish a constraint, for 
example, research the response to concrete types of images. This is where an artistic approach 
can be helpful, opening up further questions. In collaboration with the laboratory at the 
University of Oregon German artist Hannes Bend did a project “mYndful,” a study of 
correlations between visual stimuli and cognitive states. During the study, the 
electrophysiological activity of 44 subjects was recorded while asking them to perceive and rate 
their likeability of over 30,000 images on a like-type scale from 1-5 (1-high to 5-low) twice 
weekly over the course of eight weeks. The goal was to find out the positive response and to 
create a feedback based app and virtual reality environment to invoke more meditative states. 
The scientists admit that a clear consensus about what constitutes a meditative brain state is still 
to be reached, however, there are observations of correlations between this state and increased 
theta waves.19 Neuroscientist Michael Posner hypothesized that “frontal theta induced by 
meditation produces a molecular cascade that increases white matter growth and improves neural 
network connectivity”.20  
  
 4. Translation from mental images to datasets, or more simply, detection of brain signals 
(also used as an element of Gallant’s visual reconstruction research) became immediately 
inspirational for artists seeking new media of expression in the 1960s. The first artistic 
experiments with biodata most famously adopted the method of sonification of brain activity. 
Among the pioneers were the composers Alvin Lucier, Richard Teitelbaum, David Rosenblum, 
Pierre Henry, and others, who used EEG technology to translate brainwaves into sounds and thus 
make that internal information external. As the technology becomes increasingly available and 
accurate, its applications vary widely from theatrical or gallery performance, to installation, 
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responsive architecture, and locative media. Sonification is often combined with pulsating light 
and other forms of feedback that serve as a representation of that which is otherwise inaccessible 
by human consciousness. Marco Donnarumma, an artist specializing in biofeedback, combines 
brain sensing with other physiological data, such as heartbeat, blood flow and muscle 
contractions, to generate an intense vibratory and spatialized auditive stimuli. Similar scenarios 
are activated by other artists working with biofeedback. For instance, media and electronic sound 
artist Dmitry Morozov (::vtol::), in his experimental performance “The Escalation of Mind” 
(2012) monitors the brainwave activity, emotional state and facial expressions of an actor who 
serves as a control voltage generator. The signals are transformed into a unified acoustic and 
visual environment while the actor is citing fragments from Herman Hesse's “The Glass Bead 
Game.” Just as the world of Hesse’s novel, Morozov’s performance is governed by the play of 
abstractions – stemming from the body, the visible and audible forms transgress the boundaries 
of a particular individual referring to the realm of purely logical connections. Glimpses of 
pulsating curved lines, meshes of nerve-wires, spirals of light filling the whole stage space and 
swirling in it as standing lightnings, or rippling in rounds of unstable lines – all of it is 
accompanied by Hesse’s words about the higher order of connectedness between all phenomena. 
 Among the theories that explain the formation of mental images in the mind is the 
Propositional theory that considers mental images to be triggered by thoughts, or propositions 
(verbal depictions, as opposed to visual images). In Morozov’s performance, Hesse’s text serves 
not only as a verbal accompaniment, but also as a stimulant for the actor reading the text and 
producing brainwave signals. A similar effect is possible with the brainwaves based on mental 
images appearing in response to narrative situations and verbal depictions not only of 
abstractions (as in Hesse), but of more concrete and even dramatic events. In Ellen Pearlman’s 
brainwave opera, “Noor,” visual and audio interpretation of real time brain data of an actress is 
used to immerse the audience into the inner world of a covert activist under the Nazi occupation 
in France (that this actor is supposed to represent). The story of hiding from capture is read 
aloud, and as it unfolds, the panoramic display shows the imagery that corresponds to the 
emotional states of the performer enacting the protagonist’s troubles in her mind while simply 
walking around the room.  
  
 5. Besides visual processes, including mental visualizations of verbal depictions and 
narratives, brainwave detecting technologies can track and translate other types of experiences 
(and mental “impressions” produced by them). Scientific research shows that EEG can be used 
to decode motor intentions from a ‘sender’ brain that can be delivered as commands via TMS 
(Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation) to the motor cortex of a ‘receiver’ brain, making the 
receiver involuntary perform a movement imagined by the sender. This type of translation 
exemplifies one of the most important themes related to brain tracking technologies and worth 
critical investigation: control. The research itself is coming from the medical field treating 
sensory disabilities, and in this case it also closely corresponds with the less benign military 
agendas. There is a short bridge from the brainwave control of a prosthetic limb and a similar 
9 
 
control of a machine/weaponry, or simply another human. Not surprisingly though, the 
commercial development of these types of interfaces is led by the gaming industry. With the 
growing market of cheaper EEG tracking devices (or Neuroware), such as Emotiv, the field of 
neurogaming is increasingly expanding, leading to appearance of more accurate software and 
hardware, and stimulating conversations of applications in education and psychotherapy (e.g. 
attention training).   
 Movement manipulation at a distance attracted artistic interest at the beginning of the 
networked age (a prominent example is “Ping Body” by Stelarc, in which muscle contraction is 
stimulated by the activity of remote users online); yet a thought, or an act of imagination, as a 
trigger for a physical action is a principally different operation, requiring careful exploration of 
how mental states and imagination at large operate. The closest artistic illustration of this 
principle (yet without the TMS) is a performance by Ippolit Markelov and his group “12 apples,” 
in which a dancer’s movements are directed by a ‘sender’s’ brainwaves via muscle electric 
stimulation. The performer whose brain is being scanned may not be aware of what exactly is 
being sent, and the choreographic movement becomes a metaphoric form of representation of 
those inner states. 
 What is being translated into action may not even be an image in a conventional, visual 
sense, but a particular state of mind that can yet be represented as a “map.” It is, then, in that 
sense that it operates as diagrammatical, or “operable” and “performative.” Markelov’s case, 
engaging “operation” over another human points at the most radical direction of this 
technology’s application. “Chromatographic Ballads” (2013) by Ursula Damm demonstrates 
what can be done within the field of visual manipulation. Damm’s installation allows a visitor to 
direct a software framework with an EEG device and, with that, to transform an image of an 
urban public space (an image of a busy intersection or a train station presented on a screen would 
shift, get blurry or change colors in response to the brain signals that themselves are supposed to 
represent an unconscious reaction to that image). Utilizing similar principle of image control by 
neurowaves, “Brainscore” (2003) by Darij Kreuh and Janez Janša is an example of an early 
neurogame (though framed by the authors as a performance). Two operators act in a virtual 
reality environment through their avatars – abstract floating spheres, sending commands through 
a system based on operator's brain waves signals and eye movements. Yet, the brains themselves 
are treated here as metaphorical representations of wider social systems: each area of the brain is 
associated with a particular field within the internet – global migration of goods and information 
that directly affect the individuals in everyday life – meterology, stock exchange, media, 
transport and epidemic diseases. The signals from the particular brain area pinge the selection of 
webpages on these topics, and from there an abstractly depicted scenario unfolds where 
characteristics of the information from the websites are transformed into qualities, like texture, 
form, color and sound. A virtual alternative to the real world is thus created, forming a closed 
loop system distributed within the brains of the two performers/players: an analog to the whole 




 6. Finally, we come to what is most commonly known as the phenomenon of sensory 
substitution, or translation between nonvisual (usually tactile) stimulation and optical cortex. 
One of the most known findings is Paul Bach-y-Rita’s discovery of the connections between the 
optical cortex and electric stimulation of the parts of the body surfaces (e.g. abdomen, back, 
thigh, and even tongue – that makes it possible “to see with a tongue”21). Bach-y-Rita’s Tactile 
vision substitution systems (TVSS) transduce optical images picked up by a TV camera into a 
form of energy (vibratory or direct electrical stimulation) applied to the skin receptors. The 
stimuli then travel through the somatosensory pathways and structures to reach the perceptual 
levels and to form images analogous to the initial input.22 These images would differ from the 
flat images that can be felt on the skin surface and are, instead, 3-dimensional, having 
characteristics of perspective and depth. 
 Besides its practical application, this research inspires artistic expressions by visually 
impaired people. An example of that is a series of workshops organized by Jill Scott as part of 
“eskin” (2008) artistic research on the potential of tactile perception.23 The concept behind the 
workshops implied the opportunity for visually impaired participants to create movement-based 
compositions for a sighted audience. The experiment involved a wearable interface that would 
provide the performers input about their spatial orientation, as well as gestures of other 
performers. The sensors (compasses for vibration direction, accelerometers for gesture 
recognition and ultrasound to avert collisions with obstacles) and actuators were embroidered on 
the electronic circuit and connected through a Bluetooth network distributed among all the 
performers. Thus, by communicating with other actors through gesture the participants were 
trained to create their own movement theatre. 
 Throughout human culture (from Homer to Borges) blindness has been considered as a 
source of a special ability to see inwards (however romanticized this view may be). Lack of 
visual stimuli and more intensive engagement of other senses may not only provoke stronger 
imagination activity, but allow different types of thinking process itself. Art projects like Scott’s 
bring this agenda to the public discussion, helping us to be aware of the mechanisms of 
perception and cognition, and suggesting that there is no singular connection between the facts of 
reality and their interpretations in the mind. Understanding of this split between reality and 
abilities to create objective judgments about it opens eyes to the possibilities of deliberate 




In conclusion: artistic epistemologies 
Different strategies for interpretation of the invisible processes in our mind, and the designs 
underlying these procedures encourage reconfiguration of our existing understanding of the 
nature of cognition, perception, imagination and communication. Deeper analysis of the material 
basis of cognitive and perceptual processes reveals multiple discontinuities and discrepancies in 
their functioning. The problem of translation between different senses, considered here, is only 
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one among many others. While the scientists attempt to give a verifiable account of how mental 
processes work, art offers its own perspective – that of a lived experience. The abstract issues 
that neurointerface applications raise, for instance control and the ethical aspects around it, such 
as responsibility, vulnerability, etc., become tangible and personally relevant (even if for a short 
time).   
 Transforming the inner data into an object of digitalization gives access to them as data, 
with a potential to take whichever form thanks to the algorithmically established correlations. 
Yet, there remains a question of the possible fundamental incongruence between the inner 
feeling of something and the data representation of it. Artworks as essentially subjective 
experiences are capable of emphasizing the role of choices about the aesthetic characteristics of 
these representations and their additional expressive and associational qualities. It is these 
‘surplus’ perceptual characteristics that give the artistic approach not only an experiential, but 
also an epistemic value. The haptic and proprioceptive connections established through 
choreographed movement in projects like Pearlman’s or Scott’s instigate an embodied response, 
thus generating a different type of knowledge. 
 The forms of feedback offered by artists often compete with the commercially available 
devices used in gaming or self-monitoring culture (e.g. the Quantified self movement). This 
culture advocates a proactive stance on one’s self-awareness, calling for using biofeedback as a 
tool for training the body and mind to perform more efficiently, in accordance with the preset 
parameters. The framing of a project as “art” changes the perception of what is expected from 
applying these technologies. The emphasis is placed on experience of awareness itself, without a 
predisposed agenda of improvement. In a way, there are no particular expectations attached to 
these representations. In this experience of a shifted perspective on oneself lies another crucial 
epistemic potential of artistic approach. While being a fundamentally embodied experience, it 
also becomes a valuable tool in reconstituting one’s feeling of the boundaries of the self and the 
relationship between the self and the other.  
 As most of the projects discussed above demonstrate, externalization of the internal 
works as distancing oneself from oneself. Indeed, in many cases the method through which the 
invisible mental processes (images) become observable is feedback. The participants/actors in 
performances, such as Morozov’s or Donnarumma’s, are made to feel one’s own body as an 
external entity. The representations and translations are there to build connection with the 
nonrepresentable, but the value of this connection is also the awareness of its function through 
disconnection, through the negation of the conceptual self. The realization of a gap, the 
discrepancy between the inner and the outer, the subjectively felt and the sharable is in itself a 
productive feeling that prevents reifications and attachments to either of the sides. While 
sciences would treat these visualizations of data as banks of knowledge about what takes place 
inside the brain, and scientifically oriented technoculture would take that knowledge and apply it 
to everyday life agenda (e.g. self-improvement), the arts would encourage further questions, 
pointing at the facts that the numbers (and logical analysis of signals constellations and dynamic) 
can only show that much and would not be relevant for describing qualia, or affective attitudes 
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and associations that may be attached to those states. Yet, the awareness of these qualia would be 
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